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PERSONAL STATEMENT

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, it is a matter of regret to me that my duties as chairman of the mediation panel in the airline machinist dispute have occupied me all morning and have prevented my being here earlier to speak.

I very much appreciate the indulgence of the Senate and the Senate staff which enables me to speak at this time on several matters, which I am able to do through arrangement with the leadership of the Senate.

The leadership very graciously agreed to this course of action because it recognized, as one of a minority in the Senate who opposes the policies of the Johnson administration in respect to the matter I shall discuss, that the minority was entitled to present this point of view prior to the long weekend we are about to take.

I appreciate very much, as I always do, the courtesy the leadership always extends to me.

I would not have asked for this rather extraordinary procedure today if the Senate had convened at 12 o'clock noon, as I had anticipated, but it was my fault because of my duties downtown as Chairman of the Emergency Board that I did not know of the leadership's plan to convene at 10 o'clock this morning.

Mr. President, as a matter of fact, my work as Chairman of the President's Emergency Board seeking to find a fair and amicable solution to the threatened national airlines strike has kept me away from the Foreign Relations Committee markup sessions on the foreign aid bill, which I also regret, because I would like to be there to uphold the arm of Chairman Fulbright as he leads the committee in a badly needed reshaping of the aid program. But my vote has been cast by proxy for most of the changes made so far, many of which I have been struggling to bring about for some time, and I hope to be present next week to offer some more amendments on my own.

I am not at all moved by the charge already being leveled that these changes in the aid program discriminate against African countries. The changes will prove eventually to be in the interest of the African countries, for we are trying to correct the mistakes of past aid commitments that have brought disaster to South Vietnam and encouraged and made possible armed conflict among others. We are trying to apply to Africa, and to future aid everywhere, the lessons learned from the failures of the past, which include the arming of military juntas in Latin America, the giving of huge amounts of aid for political purposes that did nothing for the good of the people, and eventual American armed intervention in countries where we thought our face had to be saved because we were so heavily committed to a certain local faction through the aid program.

Aside from that, the first obligation of the committee, of Congress, and of the administration is not to any foreign country or bloc of countries. Our first obligation is to the American people, the good of the United States, and I hope that obligation will remain first in the consideration of this legislation.

A second subject that I want to mention briefly is the resolution expanding the Senate oversight committee of the Central Intelligence Agency. This issue is expected to be taken up in the Senate next week, and I want these observations to appear in the Record now.

NEED FOR EXPANDED CIA OVERSIGHT

In all the discussion about the form a Senate oversight of CIA should take, we have largely lost sight of the real issue. The issue is not whether CIA makes foreign policy. The issue is not whether it is controlled in its decision-making by the President and the Department of State and by a civilian group appointed by President Kennedy—and in my opinion it is.

The issue is whether it is sufficiently concerned and involved in international affairs to warrant the addition of Foreign Relations Committee representation in its oversight. It seems to be incontestable that it is so involved.

The chairman of the Armed Services Committee emphasizes that CIA does not make foreign policy. Yet I am sure he would agree that CIA does not make military policy, either. Does this mean the Armed Services Committee oversight should be abolished as unnecessary? That is the conclusion one would draw from the argument of the Senator from Georgia.

If anything, the Central Intelligence Agency is much more an operating arm of American foreign policy than it is of American military policy. It is on that basis that all logic should have put the Foreign Relations Committees of the House and Senate in charge of its surveillance in the first place, and not the Armed Services Committee. The Department of Defense has its own intelligence. The Department of State has its own intelligence. The CIA is separate from both, but it remains deeply involved in intelligence activities that are vital even more to foreign policy formulation than to military policy formulation. Moreover, its operations are almost entirely political. How can it be said that its activities which are operations rather than information-gathering are more military than diplomatic or political?

In 1954, CIA plotted and carried out the overthrow of the government of Guatemala. Was that a military operation or a foreign policy operation? In 1961, CIA organized the Cuban refugees and masterminded the Bay of Pigs. Was that a foreign policy program or a military program?

As I have said on many occasions in the Senate, in my capacity as chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and as chairman of the committee that conducted executive hearings by way of investigation of the CIA vis-a-vis the Bay of Pigs, the Bay of Pigs situation would not have occurred except for the foreign policy intervention of the CIA. Not even Congress was aware of what the CIA was up to, and certainly the American people were not aware of what the CIA was up to.

I repeat again: the CIA is a police state institution. We must see to it that every agency of the Federal Government is represented by the Joint Chiefs of the

Senate and in the executive departments who do not want the Foreign Relations Committee to be represented in the surveillance of the CIA, in connection with the CIA intervention in foreign policy, ought to be a warning signal to the people of the country.

The American people are entitled to have the Senate see to it that the Foreign Relations Committee is in a position of surveillance over the CIA.

In 1958, CIA helped organize opposition to Sukarno in Indonesia. Was that a foreign policy operation or a Defense Department operation? Throughout the fifties, CIA helped supply Nationalist Chinese within Burma. Was that a foreign policy program of the United States, or a Defense Department operation?

In 1956, the CIA did much through its broadcast facilities to encourage the Hungarian uprising, though when it came, we made no American military effort to help. Was that a foreign policy or a military policy effort on the part of the United States?

I think that in all these instances which have been described in books and articles, the CIA has carried out foreign policies rather than military policies for the U.S. Government. In none of the instances I have mentioned did the American Military Establishment involve itself directly. Only where events have become uncontrolled by other means, such as in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam, has the Department of Defense taken an active role.

I do not think it is at all relevant to this resolution to argue whether CIA makes the decisions on the merits of these operations. The issue of the degree of Presidential control does not concern us here. What does concern us is whether the committees of Congress whose subject matter is most affected by the Central Intelligence Agency are part of the surveillance, and at the present time they are not.

Both the intelligence-gathering and the operation functions of CIA are at least as relevant to foreign policy formulation and execution as they are to military postures and activities. In most cases, they are much more relevant to foreign policy.

The present arrangement whereby the Armed Services Committee shares in this oversight and the Foreign Relations Committee does not is a gross intrusion of the Armed Services Committee into the subject matter of foreign policy.

We see that intrusion showing its head in another form in the movement within the Senate to have military aid separated from the foreign aid program and consigned to the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. President, the evidence is undeniable that military aid is constantly used by the Pentagon to meddle in foreign policy. In my opinion, the military aid that we are furnishing to many countries in the world constitutes one of the greatest threats to world peace. The Pentagon Building has much to answer for in connection with the military aid program.

I have said before, and repeat in this address today, that in my judgment, the military aid program of the Department of Defense, as represented by the Secretary of Defense, by the Joint Chiefs of

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Staff, and by other top-ranking military officers of our country, has created more Communists in the last 10 years than has any other one cause existing on the face of the earth.

It would be more appropriate to confine the CIA oversight role entirely to the Appropriations Committee than to extend the oversight of the Armed Services Committee over so important an ingredient of foreign policy as intelligence services.

I am not at all impressed with the argument made on the floor of the Senate that some of our colleagues do not want the Foreign Relations Committee to have jurisdiction over a subject matter that deals with foreign relations because they wish to cast reflections upon the members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Such arguments are not befitting a U.S. Senator. I served on the Armed Services Committee for many years prior to going on the Foreign Relations Committee. I have served now on the Foreign Relations Committee since 1955.

There is not a scrap of evidence or justification in support of the reflections that some members of the Armed Services are casting indirectly, and sometimes not too indirectly, and frequently by innuendoes, upon the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.

As a member of those two committees during my period of service in the Senate, I have never seen a partisan vote cast in either committee. It has been my observation that Senators do not sit on the Foreign Relations Committee as Democrats or Republicans. Nor do they sit on the Armed Services Committee as Democrats or Republicans. They sit on those committees as U.S. Senators.

When differences of opinion develop on the committees, those differences are shown by the votes. The split is not reflected by Republican votes against Democratic votes. The split is a split of sincere men, Democrats and Republicans on one side, and Democrats and Republicans on the other side, of men who have come to an honest difference of opinion in regard to what the decision of the committee should be.

The argument that a larger committee would endanger secrets is a wholly false issue and it is to be regretted that it has been even mentioned on the floor of the Senate by the opposition of the McCarthy-Fulbright resolution. We are taking about three members from the Foreign Relations Committee. I am only sorry it is not possible to put into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the number of employees of CIA—who number in the thousands—the number of persons in the Budget Bureau, the number of persons on the White House staff, the number of persons in the House of Representatives, the number of persons in the State and Defense Departments, the number of persons in other Cabinet jobs who are part of the National Security Council, and the number of persons from private life who are not even in the Government, much less elected; all of whom have much knowledge and information about the activities of the CIA.

Apparently many of those people who oppose the McCarthy-Fulbright resolution think it is perfectly all right to have those hundreds of governmental personnel that never have faced a vote, as far as qualifications for office are concerned, have information which some colleagues of mine in the Senate think should be denied to the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate or the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House.

There are hundreds, and probably thousands, of foreigners in foreign governments who are well advised of CIA activities in their areas, and who presently know more than the Foreign Relations Committee knows about these matters.

I am especially intrigued by the argument against the resolution which holds that the appointment of a supervisory council of private citizens is a reasonable and presumably "secure" check on CIA but three Members of the U.S. Senate would not be. The senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], mentions the group President Kennedy appointed after the Bay of Pigs to review CIA organization and activities. Who is on that board? James Killian, president of MIT, was one of the original members. He is an educator, and an outstanding citizen. I have great confidence in him, but no more than I have in 100 U.S. Senators, including the senior Senator from Massachusetts.

Another private citizen on the intelligence consulting group is Clark Clifford. He is another fine and trustworthy man, but no more trustworthy than the 100 men and women elected to the Senate.

Another member of this group is Dr. Edwin Land, an inventor with the Polaroid Corp. Are Senators prepared to say he is worthy of being privy to CIA secrets, but Senators are not? Professor William Langer is a historian of great renown in the academic world. Is he more worthy of confidence than Senators? I do not believe so.

Others in the consulting group are William Baker—about whom I have no information—Maxwell Taylor, Admiral Sides, and former high civilians in the Defense Department, Gordon Gray and Frank Pace.

All are presumed to be private citizens at the present time. Some of them have outstanding qualifications. But do they have better qualifications than U.S. Senators, or at least better than some Senators but not others?

I am amazed that anyone would point to these private citizens and contend that they are entitled to supervise the Central Intelligence Agency, but that three Members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee are not.

If Congress is anxious to divest itself of more and more of its duties, and to invest more and more of them in the executive branch, the way to do it is to turn over CIA supervision to a group of private citizens appointed by the President and responsible only to him, and to deny all supervision to the Senate's committee in charge of foreign policy matters.

I believe it is time that the Senate began to restore, to a very modest and moderate extent, at least, the normal role this body was intended to play in foreign policy. Least of all do I see anything desirable in turning over foreign policy supervision to the Armed Services Committee, as we do with the present system.

For 21 years, in this body, I have pleaded against the trend toward the development of Government by executive supremacy and secrecy; but I am deeply alarmed—yes, frightened—for the welfare of my country, to see the galloping speed with which the Johnson administration has sought to vest more and more unchecked power in the executive branch of this Government. I want to warn the American people that in my judgment, the Johnson administration must be checked, and checked now, if we are to retain our system of three coordinate and coequal branches of Government.

We cannot continue, Mr. President—under the various flag-waving slogans that are being used these days to whip up the people of this country into a war hysteria—granting more and more unchecked power into the hands of the President of the United States and his executive Cabinet members and their associates. A basic issue faces the American people, in my judgment—basic, when you can have, as we are having at the very hour that I now speak, Mr. President, American boys dying in South Vietnam in a Presidential war that has not even been declared by the Congress of the United States.

Vietnam War

Oh, I know all the advice that I have received from dear friends here in the Senate, that I should not commit political suicide, that I should not burn my political bridges. Mr. President, it is more important that political bridges be burned in the United States in these critical hours than that steel bridges be bombed in North Vietnam.

It is more important that increasing numbers in the Senate and the House of Representatives be willing to commit political suicide—if that is the price one must pay to plead for peace in the world, and to bring to an end an immoral and shocking war that cannot be reconciled with Article I, section 8 of the Constitution—than that Members of Congress think only of their political hides.

Mr. President, it is a small sacrifice for any Member of Congress to pay—if that is the sacrifice he has to pay in order to try to bring this shocking war to a halt—to lose his office, in comparison with the supreme sacrifice, for which Members of Congress must bear the historic responsibility, because they have not stopped the President from conducting this immoral and shocking war.

I say it is a small sacrifice to pay for any Member of Congress to lose his position, if it comes to that, in comparison with the loss of American life in South Vietnam, in a war that never has been justified from the beginning.

As we approach Memorial Day, that we had better think of the great differ-

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soldiers have made during our glorious past, in justifiable wars, and the responsibility of the Johnson administration and of this Congress for causing now, already, more than 3,200 American boys to be killed in South Vietnam, and over 15,000 to be wounded, in a war we had no right to enter in the first place. The responsibility rests not only on the President, but also on the Members of Congress who have been supporting that war.

I know also, Mr. President, that when one votes as I vote, and as I shall continue to vote, short of a declaration of war—in opposition to all funds sought to be appropriated for this war—that the charge is to be expected that those of us who so vote are letting down the boys from South Vietnam. Well, let the record be clear again: Those who are letting down the boys in South Vietnam are those who are voting the funds to escalate this war and send them forward into more and more battlefields to die in increasing numbers.

They are the ones who are letting the boys down in South Vietnam, because they are walking out; they are abdicating a trust that they owe the American people, that our Founding Fathers wrote into the Constitution; namely, the check of the purse strings. If this Congress would stop voting President Johnson the funds to kill American boys in increasing numbers in South Vietnam, he would have to fall back on the sound advice of General Ridgway, of General Gavin, of George Kennan, and of the others, Mr. President, who are pointing out that we should stop escalating this war.

We should proceed to take our position at those points in South Vietnam that we can defend, without escalating the war, and that will stop the advance of the enemy, but will not involve our own advance. Then, let us put it squarely up to the other nations of the world: Do you want to assume your responsibilities to keep the peace? Do you other nations of the world want to decide, as you should have decided long ago, that there must be a cease-fire in Vietnam, and decree it?

We should then serve notice on all combatants that they must stop their fighting and pledge themselves as signatories to the United Nations Charter that they will send over whatever number of divisions of men are necessary to enforce a peace, as the United Nations has done in the Congo, is doing in the Gaza Strip, and Cyprus, and did in stopping the war between India and Pakistan.

My faith is such that in the due course of time the American people will come to understand the facts and realize that all the sacrifices we are making in American blood, plus the shocking killing of Asians, will win for us the hatred of Asians for years to come.

Mr. President, I make these remarks today in part because I think they are most appropriate before a Memorial Day. On a Memorial Day we ought to bow our heads as Americans, not only in tribute to our courageous soldiers that we have sent to South Vietnam—who are carrying

out the orders of their Commander in Chief, which is their responsibility and duty—but we should bow our heads also with feelings of shame that as a people—may I say to the American people sitting in our places of security—we are not over there doing the dying. We ought to bow our heads in shame that as free men and women we have permitted this situation to develop to the shocking point at which we now find it.

Young American draftees, 18, 19, 20, and 21 years of age, are being sent into South Vietnam, increasing percentages of them to die in a war to which we should be no party whatsoever.

I hope that on this Memorial Day the voters of this Republic, as they bow their heads in tribute to those we have lost in the past in justifiable wars, and those we are losing in Vietnam in an immoral and sinful war, will come to a better realization of their responsibility to exercise their power as free men and women to check this administration.

Sometimes, as I meditate on this matter, I ask myself the question, What is happening to us as a people? As a religious man, I speak respectfully of the churches, but would raise in this speech, to the clergy of America, the question: What has happened to you? As Mark Twain warned—and I shall use his great statement before I finish this speech—as war hysteria starts to sweep the country, soon the clergy will begin to preach sermons about God being on our side.

Already those sermons are coming forth, when what should be happening is that the church bells of America should be tolling in grief, on behalf of the religious men and women across this land, that our Government should be following such an irreligious course of action.

Already the old, superpatriotic slogans are being dusted off. We are reading them in the daily press. "My country, right or wrong."

Oh, that is the way of a country to go into oblivion, when patriotic Americans should be saying "When I find my country to be wrong, I intend to insist upon its righting its course."

What is needed in America, during these dark hours, is for the Government to right its wrong course and stop its international outlawry and return not only to the framework of the Constitution, the framework of its treaty obligations, but also return to the framework of its spiritual beliefs and obligations.

If only the pews in the churches of America could speak out against the hypocrisy of the people who occupy them by the millions each Sunday.

If only the clergy of America would live up to its responsibilities of spiritual leadership.

If only the men who speak from the pulpits of America would have the courage of the Great Master whom the Christian faith worships, or the belief in the one God whom the Jewish faith worships, or the dedication to the existence of an Almighty that all religious men and women say they believe in.

That is what is needed this Memorial Day weekend.

OREGON ELECTION AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. President, much attention has been focused in the last few days on the primary election in Oregon and its bearing on public attitudes toward the war in Vietnam.

For myself, I am heartened by the results because I think they show that the American people are deeply suspicious of administration policy there, and I think they show that candidates who have nothing to offer except the administration's war policy are not going to be elected in November in very large numbers.

Democratic voters in Oregon nominated two "peace candidates" for Congress, Malcolm Cross in the First Congressional District, and Charles Porter in the Fourth District being vacated by Mr. DUNCAN. Both overcame primary opponents who were running on the administration war policy.

In the Senate race, Howard Morgan polled well over a third of the Democratic vote, his percentage being between 35 and 40 percent.

Those of us who know where Howard Morgan started from when he announced his candidacy in March on the war or peace issue, cannot feel anything but confidence that this issue is the dominant one with the people of my State and the Nation. We take confidence only in the wisdom of the voters in judging where the interests of the Nation lie as the issue becomes clear to them.

This will not be done overnight, and it was not done overnight in Oregon among Democratic voters, who were being asked to curb a President of their own party.

Nonetheless, more than a third of them did respond. I think a major reason they did is that they know a war candidate will have tough sledding this fall against Governor Hatfield. Governor Hatfield has long been identified as one of only two or three Governors who have not rubberstamped the administration's Vietnam policy. He has continued to urge a United Nations jurisdiction over the Vietnam issue. The Republican primary voters had a chance to repudiate him for that stance if they wanted to, but instead they nominated him for U.S. Senate by nearly 4 to 1, the one being the combined vote of three rivals.

Mr. President, in spite of the downgrading of his opponent by the press that wants to misinterpret and misrepresent what happened in Oregon, Governor Hatfield's opponent, who happens to be a very respectable and well-financed businessman in Oregon, ran on the war issue. The administration supporters of the war in Vietnam can add these Oregon results in any way they like, and they will never spell victory for Democratic candidates for Congress this fall.

That is why many of us are taking this issue into Democratic primaries. Our party has reneged on its campaign promises of 1964 in the field of foreign policy.

Millions upon millions of Republicans voted for Lyndon Johnson in 1964 be-

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Then Chairman, he made it perfectly clear he held to the view that an Asian war was for Asian boys to fight and not American boys. They believed that he meant it when he made clear in that campaign that he would follow a course of action opposite to the proposals of a Barry Goldwater.

I, too, thought he meant it.

I shall never be able to understand why we have not had a single word of explanation from the President, and why almost immediately after that election he proceeded to follow the Goldwater line.

There is going across this country a wave of disillusionment in the President. That is why I believe that more Democrats in Congress than political dopesters, writing for the administration, want to admit will be defeated in November, and should be—will be defeated in November, Mr. President, and should be.

As a Democrat, I wish to say that one of the great needs of my party is to have cleaned up the foreign policy of this country. The way to clean up that foreign policy is to clean out those who are supporting the immoral course of action that we are following in South Vietnam.

I have made it clear that if the Governor of my State continues to stand for the foreign policy that he has enunciated, I shall vote for him. I shall not be campaigning for him. I shall be campaigning across America for Democratic candidates to Congress who are seeking to change my party's foreign policy vis-a-vis the war in Asia.

Furthermore, I hope I am enough of a "pro" in American politics to know that, as a Democrat, I should not involve myself in the Republican campaign in my State. I have no right, in my judgment, to inject myself into that campaign. That is the Governor's responsibility. It is a campaign for him to run. As a Democrat, however, I have the responsibility to my party, as I see my trust, to come to the assistance of Democratic candidates in other States who will run in opposition to the foreign policy programs of the Johnson administration. I shall do what I can to help elect peace candidates as against war candidates. That means those both in and out of Congress.

The faith and confidence of the American people in the Democratic Party as the one best able to maintain peace must be restored if we are to win elective office in 1966. May I say that goes for 1968, too.

That is why I think the White House is making a grievous mistake in cranking up its public relations machinery to try to rally support for a bigger war in Vietnam. I do not doubt that between now and November, the avenue between Capitol Hill and the White House will be heavily traveled. But the traffic will not be for the purpose of seeking congressional advice; it will be for the purpose of telling Congress, not asking Congress.

RAMA OR THE WAR POLICY

A leading congressional Democrat has begun the process by repeating what many of us have recognized as administration policy for a long time.

House that the United States is not going to get out of Vietnam, no matter what. The discussion of what to do if a government came to power that sought negotiations or asked us to leave is wholly unreal, because no such contingency will be allowed to happen. The American Armed Forces will not leave under any circumstances, according to present administration policy, because we have put too much emphasis upon saving our face and using southeast Asia as the testing ground for American containment of China.

I want to say to the Johnson administration that it had better start putting emphasis on saving lives of American boys, not face—saving the lives of the young draftees that we are sending over there to die, while we, safely at home, talk about face.

These justifications of the American presence in Vietnam do not leave any room for a South Vietnamese Government that does not lend itself to this American cause.

The evidence of the American takeover was highlighted by the reaction of American military commanders during the recent disturbances in Da Nang, when even General Ky's air force was warned that any more mistakes on their part that endangered American planes would bring retaliation. A Marine Corps spokesman announced that 40,000 U.S. marines in the northern part of South Vietnam were preparing to fight without any help at all from the South Vietnamese Army. The United States is making it clear to Vietnam and to the world that we will fight anyone in Vietnam who opposes the United States.

This policy can avoid no other interpretation than that our administration is on its way to taking over the war when the Vietnamese fight among themselves. What the President should have done at the first outbreak of the disturbances at Da Nang and Hue was order a cease-fire and notify the South Vietnamese that we are not going to kill American boys while they fight among themselves; that the theory of our administration has been that we are there to aid them in their war, not ours—I repeat, in their war, not ours.

In my judgment, the undeniable fact is that we are taking over the war and, apparently we are going to fight in one part of Vietnam with 40,000 U.S. marines without any Vietnamese soldiers joining them.

When the American people come to understand those trends the American people will answer the administration's bullets in Vietnam with ballots in the United States.

If this is not making South Vietnam an American colony, what is? If this is not a territorial design upon Vietnam, what is? There can no longer be a pretense that we are in Vietnam at the invitation of a legitimate government. Of course, it never was legitimate. It was born out of the womb of illegality.

In open violation of the Geneva accord, the United States turned the 17th parallel from a military demarcation line into a political demarcation line. It was the United States, in open violation of the Geneva accord, that decided on two

Vietnams. We created an illegal government in South Vietnam. Read the accords. I have read them on the floor of the Senate time and time again during the past 3 years. The 17th parallel was drawn as a military demarcation line, and the accords so indicate.

There was no provision for two separate governments. The French military forces—and there were thousands of French troops in Vietnam at the time—were to go to the south of the line. The Viet Minh, who had won a victory over the French, were to stay to the north.

During the next 2 years, under the direction of an international control commission composed of India, Canada, and Poland, negotiations and procedures were to be set up leading to a united Vietnam based upon elections. We stopped those elections, although we Americans talked a good hypocritical line about self-determination. But we prohibited self-determination in Vietnam in 1956.

It will take more time for the American people to come to a realization that the statements of spokesmen for the U.S. Government that our government made a commitment to South Vietnam is itself completely fallacious.

They involved themselves in a civil war, and they should be allowed to settle their civil war without dictation from the United States. I think that history will prove me correct in my belief that the struggle within Vietnam will continue no matter how much we maintain our presence there over the decades, until at long last there will be one country and one government, and there should be.

The U.S. Government has been able to sell to the American people the false assumption that we are justified in insisting on two Vietnams—of our own illegal creation.

AMERICAN COURSE OF EMPIRE IN ASIA

Mr. President, the world will not overlook the contrast between our use of a weak, disorganized Asian country as an American battlefield, and our policy toward France and NATO.

It is generous to call what we are doing to Vietnam "arrogance of power." We are ruthlessly occupying South Vietnam to serve American security interests as we see them. More than that, we are building yet another huge air base in northeast Thailand, which will serve first to step up American air attacks upon Laos and North Vietnam, and which will serve secondly to enlarge the battlefield to include Thailand.

In Europe, we recognize and deal with De Gaulle as an equal. When he tells us to leave, we begin making plans to depart, despite our conviction that French soil is vital to our security.

But in a small Asiatic country we appoint a new set of national leaders when the existing ones do not do our bidding and do it effectively. General Ky is now doing what the American Embassy told him to do, and is putting down all opposition by force of the arms we gave him.

That will not end the opposition. Using arms against people who are without arms will not win them over to our side, but will cause them to dig deeper into their hate and to resolve more firmly that, no matter how many decades it

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times, the white man will be thrown out of Vietnam and all of Asia.

That is why we are building a great race war. The color line is becoming an important factor in American foreign policy in Asia because it is unilateral American foreign policy. We do not pursue a strictly unilateral policy toward industrial nations, which are largely white, only toward backward ones which are largely nonwhite.

Today, General Ky is traveling around Vietnam in a U.S. military jet in an effort to consolidate his military forces and is killing his own people.

The Buddhist religion is an interesting religion. Those who are directing American foreign policy could well afford to spend some time analyzing the philosophy of the Buddhist religion, because, in my judgment, force will not conquer a Buddhist. I believe that we are creating a spirit of hatred and revenge against Americans that will rise to plague us for decades to come.

Many people do not like to face one facet of the war in Vietnam. But it must be discussed. South Vietnam has many of the overtones and undertones of a religious war between Buddhists and Christians, with the Christians in a small minority. But eventually, Mr. President, we shall learn, after we have expended untold quantities of American blood, that the Buddhists will prevail.

They will not prevail on the battlefield, but they will prevail with long-time public support.

Administration spokesmen have tried to ascribe racist motives to those of us who oppose the war. They suppose the world does not see that we respect France, Britain, Germany, and other white NATO countries—yes, Portugal, too—as equals, while we jerk General Ky and his fellow generals of Vietnam around like puppets on a string.

What the world does see is that the United States respects only power and regards weakness as a power vacuum that must be filled by the United States wherever any of the worldwide security interests of this country are thought to be affected.

The great innovation and contribution of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright] has been to try to help the United States break away from the pattern of power that has seen all the empires of the world dissolve because they thought their material wealth and power could accomplish things it could not in fact accomplish. If he can succeed in modifying even to a small degree that dismal pattern of history, then he will have made a remarkable addition to human affairs.

He has to be a born optimist even to make the effort. Many more people believe that the United States can only go down the same fatal path that all other empires have trod before us, seeing everything they did not control as a potential threat, constructing outposts of empire, then lifelines of empire, then outposts to guard the lifelines, fighting wars to protect the outposts that guard the lifelines, setting up and subsidizing governments from which to wage the wars, through military and economic aid, ad infinitum,

until the structure collapsed of its tremendous weight.

I do not want to leave that legacy to future generations of American boys and girls. What my Government does and what the people of this country do in the months immediately ahead will determine the destiny of this Republic from the standpoint of answering the question, "Will it survive?"

In my judgment, my country has no hope of surviving in history if it leads mankind into a massive war, as it is presently doing in Asia, only to end up in a third world war.

The colonial empires of Western Europe were centuries in the building and only decades in the collapse. Others, like Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany, were years in the building and only months in the collapse.

We are engaged in a major war in Vietnam today for these very same purposes of empire. We upset the Geneva agreements of 1954 because we feared that if we did not control South Vietnam, someone else would, and a hostile power might some day use it to threaten our "lifeline" through the Malacca Straits to the Indian Ocean. That is the reason for the present war, and all the window dressing about fighting for freedom and democracy is becoming more and more of a hollow mockery not only to the world, but also to the American people themselves.

Our trouble is that there is hardly a corner of the globe that we do not now regard as vital to our security. Our "lifelines" are everywhere; every continent is an outpost for some American security interest.

We maintain more troops on foreign soil than any other nation, and we maintain more military bases abroad than any other nation.

It is the United States that has become the great military occupier of many parts of the world and is frightening increasing millions of people, including many in France. We cannot eliminate from the NATO crisis in France the determination of many Frenchmen to see to it that the American military presence is taken out of France. And if I were a Frenchman, I would insist on it, too.

Why do we think that we can maintain these security interests by force of arms when no one has been able to do it before us? Why do we think we can occupy and use South Vietnam to serve American security interests without eternal war?

The fighting among the Buddhists and the government factions does not differ much from all the other disorders that have beset colonies or occupied territories in the last century and a half. The American forces and the South Vietnamese Army which has become little different from what it was under the French can continue to suppress revolts and uprisings throughout the portions of Vietnam we still control. But they will not end; they will not stop.

We may suppress the organized armies of the Vietcong, but it was not an organized army that dislodged all the other colonial powers from Africa and Asia. It was continuing, unceasing resistance

that largely took the form of terrorism that finally caused them to give up these territories. The U.S. Government has decided its national security requires us to control South Vietnam. For home consumption, we said we were fighting for freedom, and when that became untrue on the face of it, we said we were fighting to save face because Americans have never backed down anywhere.

How many lives will it take to save our face? If we are lucky, North Vietnam at some point will not pour in more of her own forces, though we probably are far from that point as yet. But even if the opposition army does not grow, we have only a future of terrorism in South Vietnam.

CONTAINMENT IN ASIA

That is not the containment of communism which I have supported and voted for in the past. The Greek-Turkish issue was not one of Greeks and Turks against an American army of occupation and a puppet government of the United States. The Korean war was not fought to maintain South Korea as an American outpost—it was fought by the United Nations to repel an intrusion of one government against another. The Marshall plan was designed to help local governments rebuild their internal economies, not to buy American entree and occupation of the kind we have imposed upon South Vietnam.

How well do I remember the day of the enunciation of the Truman doctrine. When I returned from that historic joint session, I took the floor of the Senate on the other side of the aisle that afternoon, and I was the only Senator who did. I pledged my support to President Truman in support of the Truman doctrine. But the Truman doctrine has no analogous relationship whatsoever with South Vietnam.

The obsession with the concept of containment has led us into a frightening abuse of the concept in Vietnam. Containment must mean firm local governments, enjoying the confidence and support of their people. Where those conditions do not exist today, the United States cannot create them. Where we substitute ourselves for local forces, as we have in Vietnam, we create not containment, but a hemorrhage of proportions over which the other side and not the United States has control.

I would like to see us return to an effective and workable containment in Asia. I would like to see us recognize that an obsession with "winning" everything, everywhere to which someone once committed us 10 years ago is not containment, but paranoia. I say respectfully that in my judgment, I think our Government is suffering from paranoia in its foreign policy. Successful containment must recognize that where a local people cannot or will not help themselves, the United States jeopardizes itself and does not serve itself when we substitute American bodies for Asian bodies.

South Vietnam is becoming a hemorrhage of the American military, financial, and spiritual body. When we make the statements that have been coming

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that effect that because we have never backed down anywhere we will never back down in Vietnam, we are giving complete control over our hegemony to the Communists.

It is the administration, and the White House, who are sacrificing flexibility in Vietnam policy. It is they who have hardened the American position to one of not leaving no matter what happens in South Vietnam. By so doing, they have eliminated local responsibility for the war, for everyone in South Vietnam is put on notice that Americans will stay and take over whether South Vietnamese want to continue fighting or not.

If we shift the containment policy of the past, which originally featured viable local governments, into a containment around the fringes of China and Russia by American arms and American fighting men, we can expect only to be drawn into more and more of these conflicts.

This is not an issue of asking others to do our fighting for us. It is a question of whether Americans can do all the fighting for everyone in the world. Of course, we think we can now. We think we can keep over 300,000 men in Europe while Europeans decline to fulfill their subscriptions to NATO. We think we can send over 260,000 men into Vietnam, 15,000 into Thailand, and tens of thousands more into nearby areas of southeast Asia, plus thousands of others into the Dominican Republic, and keep all these balls in the air at one and the same time with little or no help.

This is not containment. It is not another case of "Munich" in Vietnam, when the foreign soldiers who have come from 8,000 miles away are ours.

The escalation and widening of the war by the United States has resulted only in similar measures by the other side. With each new step, we were assured that this was the one that would end the war, and each time our officials have been wrong. It is time to adopt a new approach. Therefore I recommend to the President again today that he study the offerings of General Gavin, General Ridgway, George Kennan, and the others who are urging that we stop escalating the war, that we call upon the other nations of the world for a cease-fire order, and that we make it perfectly clear that if the other nations of the world are not willing to enforce a peace in Vietnam, we then will get out. But we must stop making ourselves the unilateral policeman of the world, based upon our draftsmanship of the law, our proposals, irrespective of who shares our views.

Militarily, the tactics advocated by Generals Gavin and Ridgway are sound, if adopted along with political steps I have mentioned. Those tactics call for maintaining the positions we now have, from which we cannot be dislodged by the Vietcong. Politically, I would have the President go not to Honolulu to meet with the military funkies we put in charge in South Vietnam, but go to the United Nations and ask that body to exercise in South Vietnam its peace-keeping duties. He should ask the Security Council to order a cease-fire and to send into South Vietnam whatever

that option is vetoed by some Security Council member, he should ask the General Assembly to take the action. The U.N. has done this effectively in the Middle East, in Cyprus, in the Congo, and more recently it obtained a cease-fire between India and Pakistan. A prevailing view at the U.N. now is that it cannot act against the United States without our good faith cooperation because we are too big and too powerful. A vast number of U.N. members take it for granted that when we enlarged the war to include North Vietnam we were not acting like a nation that wanted to end the war or to get the U.N. to help us end it.

South Vietnam is not ours, to decide her fate as we please. The United Nations is the only agency that has that right. We should turn the problem over to it in good faith. Other U.N. members should realize, too, that if they fail to discharge their peacekeeping duty, the U.N. will be destroyed, for it will not hold the confidence of anyone if it fails to act on the greatest threat to world peace since Korea.

Mr. President, as I close, I shall read from two letters, and then a brief quotation from Mark Twain. I wish to read portions of two letters from a very important and responsible newspaper correspondent, whose name I shall not reveal, but whose letters speak for themselves; and I shall read all parts of the letters that do not disclose his identity:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am an American foreign correspondent who has covered South Vietnam continuously for several years.

He then describes his duties since he has been there:

I have lived here longer than any other American correspondent and longer than nearly any other American.

I have not always agreed with your views over the years, but somehow I find myself increasingly drawn to your point of view with respect to the American involvement in this country. You have consistently shown the courage, furthermore, to keep fighting against enormous odds, for beliefs that deserve to be heard.

The tragedy of Viet Nam, it seems to me, has been not so much the basic political defeat the United States has suffered here, but rather the reasons for that defeat. There have been many dedicated young Americans working in this country over the years for things they believed would match the challenge of Asian communism. They have been unwavering, I believe, by the kind of thinking that motivates the Pentagon, and by all those who find the police-state solution the most practical approach to foreign policy.

Perhaps, after all, Americans as a nationality lack the political wisdom to be able to cope with the great issues of Asia. If that is true, Asia is surely best left to itself to decide its own fate.

But apart from that, it seems that sometimes the entire Congress has been cowed by the Directorate. In recent votes, your voice has been one of the very few retaining the courage of dissent.

Thank God there is still WAYNE MORSE in the Senate.

Thereafter, I wrote to him to ask permission to use the letter. I received permission to use it in full, but I am not using it in full, Mr. President. Although I respect his courage, nevertheless I shall

use it only to the extent that I am using it today.

I received a reply to my letter from this great correspondent, as follows:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Warm thanks for your very thoughtful letter of April 12. Of course, you may use my letter to you in any way you see fit. I would only ask that you not suggest that my views in any way reflect those—

And then I paraphrase, of his previous employees.

I speak only for myself. Indeed, my views probably are not shared even by a majority of the press corps in Saigon.

I feel the press corps in general must be shielded from the continuous charges of bias and malice and such that come from such of our critics as Senators. Privately, newsmen in Viet Nam are at bitter odds with each other and have strong views on every aspect of this problem. Most of them, I'm happy to say, discipline their personal feelings to such a degree that their news copy remains undistorted.

But there are those who feel the press should be uniform in its support for official policy, and that its reporting should conform to this idea. There are those who delight in watching reporters beaten up, maligned and restricted. There are even those who take some pleasure in the fact that ten of us have been killed and about 30 wounded covering this war. Today we were treated once again to the spectacle of Vietnamese police assaulting foreign newsmen, and somehow I had the sensation that nothing changes here; that since 1963 there has not been the slightest vestige of progress, despite the billions of dollars and all the lives.

Against this background, there are some of us who feel the survival of a free press is in grave danger. My own deepest hope is that I will not live to see the day when either our nation's Congress or its news media become obsolete.

Respectfully,

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following my remarks there be printed in the Record certain newspaper articles, telegrams, and correspondence which I have received dealing with the subject matter of my speech today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, I spoke earlier in my speech today about Memorial Day. I suggested that on Memorial Day we should not only bow our heads in reverence to the brave soldiers of our country who have died in war under the direction of various Commanders in Chief, but that we should also pray that we bring to an end what I consider to be a war that constitutes a sin against humanity in Vietnam; that we stop killing American boys in South Vietnam in a war I consider to be immoral, unconstitutional, and unconscionable. I expressed the hope that on Memorial Day, from their pulpits, the clergy of America would give serious thought, as spiritual leaders, to the question: "Have I, as an individual and minister of God carried out my spiritual responsibility in connection with this war?"

I spoke earlier today about those of us who take the position that this issue is more important than politics; that this issue leaves no room for any con-

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intention of partisans' policies, for it pales
all other issues into insignificance.

Those of us who take that position
must expect that in a period of war hy-
steria, so-called superpatriotic, jingoistic
forces in this country are going to
urge that we be silenced; and certainly
are going to misrepresent our position, as
they have been doing now for quite some
time.

But so long as we are in an undeclared
war I shall continue to do what I can to
urge the American people to defeat can-
didates for office who are supporting the
war, because that is the only answer left
to the free people to make the constitu-
tional check that is their right as free
men and women. That is why I have said:
we must stop this administration's bul-
lets in Vietnam with ballots in the United
States.

I close my speech today with this great
quotation from Mark Twain in a great
writing of his "The Mysterious Stranger,"
which I think is so apropos:

There has never been a just one, never an
honorable one—on the part of the instigator
of the war. I can see a million years ahead,
and this rule will never change in so many
as half a dozen instances. The loud little
handful—as usual—will shout for the war.
The pulpit will—warily and cautiously—ob-
ject—at first; the great big, dull bulk of the
nation will rub its sleepy eyes and try to
make out why there should be a war, and will
say, earnestly and indignantly, "It is unjust
and dishonorable, and there is no necessity
for it." Then the handful will shout louder.
A few fair men on the other side will argue
and reason against the war with speech and
pen, and at first will have a hearing and be
applauded; but it will not last long; those
others will outshout them, and presently the
anti-war audiences will thin out and lose
popularity. Before long you will see this
curious thing: the speakers stoned from the
platform, and free speech strangled by hordes
of furious men who in their secret hearts
are still at one with those stoned speakers—
as earlier—but do not dare to say so. And
now the whole nation—pulpit and all—will
take up the war-cry, and shout itself hoarse,
and mob any honest man who ventures to
open his mouth; and presently such mouths
will cease to open. Next the statesmen will
invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon
the nation that is attacked, and every man
will be glad of those conscience-soothing hu-
mities, and will diligently study them, and
refuse to examine any refutations of them;
and thus he will by and by convince himself
that the war is just, and will thank God for
the better sleep he enjoys after this process
of grotesque self-deception.

As we bow our heads in prayer this
Memorial Day in the veterans' ceme-
teries across the country, it would be well
if we also contemplate this great analy-
sis of a war psychology that came from
the pen of Mark Twain.

There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the Record.

BEDFORD, MASS.

April 9, 1966.

Dear Senator Morse: I know that Sena-
tors do not insert in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD articles about themselves. I am ask-
ing that you insert the enclosed clipping
about Senator Gruening in the Record. He
is a great man, a tribute to America, and a
living proof that statesmanship is not dead.

You too have stood alone in the face of
bitter hatred and abuse in opposing the war
in Vietnam. God bless you for it. Now the
other ninety-eight members of the Senate
are seeing that you two were right all along;
we are supporting dictatorship! As I have
said for many years, we have no business
in Vietnam; the people do not want our
"help" in the form of napalm and bullets.
Their military dictators and our puppets do
certainly want our billions and our blood, but
their people don't. As Eisenhower said a
long time before this mess grew to its pres-
ent levels, eighty per cent of the people want
Ho Chi Minh. It is obvious that the people
of DaNang, Hue, and even Saigon do not
want Hitler-admiring Ky.

I say to President Johnson, "Mr. Presi-
dent, now is your chance to get us out. The
people of South Vietnam are going to throw
us out, despite their dictators, our Pentagon,
and the CIA. Why in God's name don't we
get out and throw the entire problem to the
United Nations. Mr. President, bring home
our boys, not our pine boxes!"

Sincerely,

W. BRUCE DEAN.

EVANSTON, ILL.

May 18, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senator of Oregon,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Morse: Thank you very
much for sending me the copy of the Con-
gressional Record "Legal Issues of U.S. Posi-
tion in Vietnam." I appreciate it very much.
I am writing, too, to thank you again for
your courage in speaking out against the
Administration's policy in Viet Nam—namely
for speaking out against the Administration's
foreign policy in general. I read all of your
public statements and privately applaud
them. As a private citizen and the mother of
three small boys (5½, 4, and 2 years), I am
so grateful to you for speaking out against
Rusk and President Johnson's policies in
the Dominican Republic, Viet Nam, and as
regards Prime Minister Ky. You speak for
me, too. And you speak for me, too, and
many other mothers when you say that it is
the American military that is the greatest
threat to world peace.

I signed and mailed in to Washington the
recently circulated voter's pledge—pledging
support to all congressional candidates who
will work for peace. I hope that my signa-
ture and other signatures throughout the
country will give you and the handful of
courageous Senators who will speak out
against administration policy in Viet Nam
and against present Administration foreign
policy in general some support.

I hope, too, that the bill will be passed
which will help to curb CIA activities by
having some members of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee on a committee to watch
over its activities.

Again, many thanks for your courage in
speaking out against Administration For-
eign Policy—particularly as regarding Viet
Nam.

Most sincerely,

MARSDA CONNER.

MAY 27 1966

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